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Designating Areas Unsuitable for Surface
Coal Mining
Then the coal company came with the world's largest shovel
And they tortured the timber and stripped all the land
Well, they dug for their coal till the land was forsaken
Then they wrote it all down as the progress of man
And daddy won't you take me back to Muhlenberg County
Down by the Green River where Paradise lay
Well I'm sorry my son, but you're too late in asking
Mr. Peabody's coal train has hauled it away*
The ravages wrought by the reckless employient of surface
coal mining methods are a familiar chapter in our history. Land-
scapes were devastated and water systems irreparably damaged; yet
for many years these problems were largely ignored. More recently
the states began to accept responsibility for the control of surface
coal mining within their boundaries,' and most have enacted legisla-
tion aimed at protecting land and water resources. Federal efforts
to enact legislation for controlling the adverse impacts of surface
coal mining date back almost forty years but were wholly unsuccess-
ful until the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977 (SMCRA) .2 This comprehensive legislation has
three primary goals: (1) to protect the environment from the adverse
impacts of past, present, and future surface coal mining; (2) to en-
courage those states where there is or may be surface coal mning to
establish their own regulatory authority that conforms with the re-
quirements of the Act; and (3) to provide for research and develop-
ment of economically viable coal extracting techniques that are less
environmentally destructive than present methods.'
Recognition of the environmental problems caused by surface
coal mining has encouraged the belief that surface mining should
be absolutely banned on certain lands to preserve natural values.'
* John Prine, Paradise (copyright 1971, Cotillion Music, Inc.) (reprinted with the per-
mission of the author).
1. See STATE SURFACE MINING LAWS: A SURVEY, A COMPARISON WITH THE PROPOSED FED-
ERAL LEGISLATION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. Pub L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328). The
lengthy legislative history of the law is outlined in H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
140 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1543, 1622. For a more thorough
analysis of the history of the federal surface coal mining legislation see, Dunlap, An Analysis
of the Legislative History of the Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975, 21 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1975).
3. A general statement of purposes is found at SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (Supp.
Nov. 1977).
4. Several states have experimented with the concept of designating certain areas as
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The SMCRA strongly reflects Congress' adherance to this principle.
This Note will examine those SMCRA provisions which mandate
the prohibition of surface coal mining on certain lands. Primary
attention will be accorded Section 522 of the SMCRA, entitled Des-
ignating Areas Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining. Under this sec-
tion there are two categories of lands designated as unsuitable for
surface coal mining: those designated expressly by statute, and
those designated by a regulatory authority. The latter category may
be further separated into lands on which the regulatory authority
must prohibit surface coal mining and lands for which the regula-
tory authority has some discretion in determining whether to pro-
hibit surface coal mining. The following discussion considers what
results can and should be expected from this system.
I. STATUTORY DESIGNATIONS
The SMCRA specifically precludes surface coal mining opera-
tions5 on certain lands. Easily identifiable among these are lands
within the National Park System,6 the National Wildlife Refuge
System, the National System of Trails, the National Wilderness
Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System (including
rivers under study for inclusion in this sytem), and National Recrea-
tion Areas.' Conspicuous for their absence from this list are Na-
tional Conservation Areas, National Lakeshores, and areas under
study for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.
It may be, however, that the laws and regulations presently govern-
ing these areas are sufficient in themselves to preclude surface min-
ing.'
unsuitable for surface coal mining. See, e.g., MONTANA REv. CODEs ANN. § 50-1042(2) (Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14-05.1 (Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 45-6A-9.1
(Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 35.502.24(g)(iv) (Supp. 1975). These state provisions are now
largely irrelevant since few are as strict as SMCRA and the SMCRA expressly supercedes
less stringent state laws. But see MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 7-505(b) (1974). States can,
however, pass more stringent standards than are required by the SMCRA. See SMCRA § 505,
30 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (Supp. Nov. 1977).
5. The statute defines this term to cover nearly all activities associated with surface coal
mining. See SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(28) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
6. This system includes National Monuments, National Seashores, and several other
types of specifically designated lands. See 36 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1976).
7. SMCRA § 522(e)(1), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e)(1) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
8. These omissions should not present much of a problem at this time since these areas
are relatively few in number and those presently designated do not contain any significant
amounts of known strippable coal reserves. Still, the Congress should be aware of this loop-
hole so that future designations of National Lakeshores and Conservation areas, such as may
soon occur in Alaska, are drafted with a full appreciation of this omission.
9. For example, the stated purpose of the legislation designating the California Desert
Conservation Area is "to provide for the immediate and future protection and administration
of the public lands . . . and the maintenance of environmental quality." 43 U.S.C.A. §
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Undoubtedly the most controversial statutory category of lands
deemed unsuitable for surface coal mining is the national forest
designation. Largely as a result of the controversy surrounding the
protection of such a massive area of land, this prohibition became
subject to a potentially emasculating loophole.'0 Essentially, the
SMCRA does maintain an outright ban in national forests east of
the 100th meridian" and in the Custer National Forest in Montana
2
except under special circumstances where the surface mining is inci-
dental to an underground mining operation. But surface coal 'iining
is permitted on all other national forest lands
if the Secretary [of Interior] finds that there are no significant recre-
ational, timber, economic or other values which may be incompatible
with such surface mining operations and . . . where the Secretary of
Agriculture determines with respect to lands which do not have
significant forest cover within those national forests west of the 100th
meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with the Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments
1781(b) (Supp. 1977). To achieve this goal the law provides for comprehensive, long term land
use planning and, though mineral development is expressly permitted, it does not seem likely
that activities as disruptive as surface coal mining would be found compatible with the
required plan. Legislation governing other special lands omitted from the surface mining ban
may be found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m-8, 460s, 460u, 460w, 460x, 460y (1976).
An even stronger case can be made for the proposition that surface coal mining is prohib-
ited on at least some of those lands that have potential for inclusion in the National Wilder-
ness Preservation System. Under the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976),
all national forest lands classified by the U. S. Forest Service as "primitive" are administered
in accordance with the regulations which prohibit such necessary concomitants of surface coal
mining as roads and motorized vehicles. These regulations effectively preclude surface coal
mining in national forest primitive areas. 36 C.F.R. § 293.17(a) (1976). The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 1977), has broadened
the scope of Wilderness Act type designations to all public lands, id. § 1702(e), and has
significantly extended its protection to roadless areas having significant wilderness character-
istics which have not yet been studied for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation
System. It provides for management "so as not to impair the suitability of such lands for
wilderness." Id. § 1782(c). This provision would clearly seem to prevent surface coal mining
on public lands until the completion of a wilderness review.
10. SMCRA § 522(e)(2)(B), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e)(2)(B) (Supp. Nov. 1977). At one
point during its legislative history this provision established an absolute ban on all surface
coal mining on national grasslands as well as national forest lands. As a compromise, and in
recognition of the vast quantities of strippable coal on the national grasslands in northeastern
Wyoming, the sponsors limited the ban to national forest lands. The House and Senate
committees that put the final bill together further watered down this provision. See H.R. REP.
No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1543, 1557.
11. This line runs north-south, coincident with the eastern border of the Texas panhan-
dle.
12. The Senate version of the bill would have included Alaskan national forest lands
within the general ban, but the conference committee defeated this provision. See H.R. REp.
No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1977).
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Act of 1975, the National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the
provisions of this Act.'
This determination is thus reduced to findings by the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Interior 4 as to the "significance" of forest land
resources for uses other than surface coal mining-a determination
with potentially excessive discretion. Regulations are needed to con-
fine this discretion. In developing these regulations, an effort should
be made to eschew the mechanistic numerical approach to decision-
making that often seems.to characterize such determinations. The
exclusive use of criteria such as fishing days, visitor days, board feet
of timber, and animal unit months of grazing 5 cannot satisfactorily
reflect the quality of a particular resource or its potential future
value. Certainly, numerical evaluations should be given some cred-
ence in reaching a decision as to the suitability of lands for surface
coal mining, but excessive reliance on numbers tends to make the
decision making process overly mechanical.
An alternate method of evaluating forest lands that would allow
more critical scrutiny of actual resource values would be an adver-
sary proceeding such as the following: Regulations would establish
a rebuttable presumption that all national forest lands are unsuita-
ble for surface coal mining. Any interested person who desired to
challenge this presumption could petition both the Secretaries of
Interior and Agriculture through their designated representatives to
open certain forest lands to surface coal mining. The petition would
describe the lands involved and include evidence affirmatively dem-
onstrating that the values referred to in the above section of the
SMCRA were not adversely affected, and that compliance with all
applicable laws could be achieved. Other interested persons who
might be affected by the proposed opening would be given the op-
portunity to bolster or refute the submitted evidence. If deemed
necessary, an oral hearing would be held. On the basis of the record
thus gathered, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture would
issue separate written decisions addressing those factors they are
required to consider. An adverse decision by either Department
13. SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e)(2) (Supp. Nov. 1977) (emphasis added).
14. Although the responsibilities of the Secretary of Interior will frequently be ad-
dressed in this article, it is the Director of the new Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM) who will have the primary responsibility for implementing the new Act.
See id. § 201, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1211 (Supp. Nov. 1977).
15. Such criteria are commonly incorporated into evaluations in environmental impact
statements prepared under the authority of Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See, e.g., IDAHO STATE OFFICE, BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT CHAL-
LIS UNIT GRAZING PROGRAM, 1-1, 2-109, -116, 3-53, -54, 4-1 (1977).
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would require the denial of the petition. The decisions would, of
course, be subject to judicial review,'" and would be catalogued,
made available to the public, and used as precedents for future
decisions. This approach would be compatible with the ostensible
congressional intent to recognize surface coal mining on national
forest lands as exceptions to the general rule.
7
The SMCRA specifically precludes surface coal mining opera-
tions on three other kind of lands. These include lands
(1) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or
places included in the National Register of Historic Sites unless ap-
proved jointly by the regulatory authority and the Federal, State, or
local agency with jurisdiction over the park or the historic sites;
(2) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of
any public road . . . ; or
(3) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, un-
less waived by the owner thereof, [or] within three hundred feet of
any public building, school, church, community, or institutional
building, public park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.'"
The most intriguing of these provisions is the first, given the
broad interpretation that might be accorded the "adversely affect"
language. Under a reasonable interpretation, the necessary approval
must be acquired not only where a public park or historic site is
directly affected, but also where surface mining on other lands has
an indirect impact on these lands. Thus, even mining located many
miles from a park that adversely affects its air or water quality
would have to be approved by the agency having jurisdiction over
the park. This interpretation would substantially alleviate fears
that Secretary of Interior Andrus"9 expressed during the hearings
on the bill. Recognizing the fact that impacts of surface coal mining
extend far beyond the site itself, Secretary Andrus sought an
amendment that would have banned surface coal mining on federal
lands in critical areas adjacent to National Parks, National Recrea-
tion Areas, and other such lands designated in Section 522(e)(1)
of the SMCRA. 20 Where critical non-federal lands are adjacent to
National Parks and Recreation Areas, Secretary Andrus proposed
16. Judicial review of final agency actions must be permitted under the Administrative
Procedures Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
17. The law suggests such an intent on its face by first announcing a general ban on
surface coal mining in national forests and then setting out exceptions. See SMCRA §
522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C.A. 1272(e)(2) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
18. Id. §§ 522(e)(3)-(5), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1272(e)(3)-(5).
19. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1543, 1643.
20. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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that the Interior Department be required to petition to have them
designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining. Although the sug-
gestion of Secretary Andrus was not adopted, the interpretation
discussed above may give him a large part of the authority that he
sought, at least for lands near public parks. Furthermore, since the
proposal of Secretary Andrus seems consistent with the intent of
the law it might be reasonably anticipated that the Secretary can
accomplish by regulation what he was unable to persuade the Con-
gress to do expressly by statute.
The statutory designation provisions thus far addressed are in-
applicable to surface coal mining operations extant as of August 3,
1977, and are further "subject to valid existing rights."2' This latter
clause was intended to prevent incursions on those property rights
presently protected by law, 22 but to go no further. The legislative
history of the Act cited the case of United States v. Polino as
illustrative of the statutory intent. There, a private owner conveyed
the surface rights on a parcel of land to the United States expressly
reserving mining and mineral rights. The land was acquired for a
part of the Monongahela National Forest. The court held that the
deed did not reserve the right to conduct strip mining operations.
The apparent upshot of Polino, and consequently of the statutory
language, is to make all private mineral reservations subject to the
statutory designation provisions unless the deed expressly reserved
or clearly implied the right to surface mine. Several efforts to change
the SMCRA to recognize the surface mining rights in deeds similar
to that involved in the Polino case were unsuccessful. 24
21. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
22. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1543, 1581, which states:
[1It is not the intent, nor is it the effect of the provision to preclude surface coal
mining on private inholdings within the national forests. The language "subject to
valid existing rights" in section 522(e) is intended, however, to make clear that the
prohibition of strip mining on the national forests is subject to previous court interpre-
tations of valid existing rights. . . .The party claiming such rights must show usage
or custom at the time and place where the contract is to be executed and must show
that such rights were contemplated by the parties. The phrase "subject to valid exist-
ing rights" is thus in no way intended to open up national forest lands to strip mining
where previous legal precedents have prohibited stripping.
23. 131 F. Supp. 772 (1955).
24. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 Before the
Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural




A. The Regulatory Machinery
1. Federal-State Relationships under the SMCRA- Under
the SMCRA, the states have the first opportunity to establish a
program for regulating surface coal mining within their bounda-
ries. 25 But, if a state fails to submit such a program to the Secretary
of Interior by January 3, 1979, or to resubmit an acceptable program
within sixty days after the disapproval of a submitted program, or
to enforce an approved program, then the Secretary of Interior must
impose a federal program on that state." Among other things, a
state program must include "a process for designation of areas as
unsuitable for surface coal mining in accordance with section 522'27
and the manpower and money to carry out this process.28
The designation process required by the SMCRA essentially
mandates that the state conduct comprehensive land use planning
for those lands that have potential for surface coal mining. 29 The Act
requires that the state provide for:
(A) a State agency responsible for surface coal mining lands
review;
(B) a data base and inventory system which will permit proper
evaluation of the capacity of different land areas to support and
permit reclamation of surface coal mining operations;
(C) a method or methods for implementing land use planning
decisions concerning surface coal mining operations; and
(D) proper notice, opportunities for public participation, in-
cluding a public hearing prior to making any designation or redesig-
nation .... 30
In addition, the Act requires that "[d]eterminations of the unsuit-
25. This provision includes the opportunity to regulate surface coal mining on federal
lands within a state. SMCRA § 523(c), 30 U.S.C.A § 1273(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977). It apparently
does not, however, include the power to designate federal lands as unsuitable for surface coal
mining. Id. § 503(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(5).
26. Id. §§ 503, 504, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1253, 1254.
27. Id. § 503(a)(3), (5), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(3), (5).
28. Federal lands within a state are, however, designated by the Secretary of Interior
after consultation with the state. See id. §§ 503(a)(5), 522(b), 30 U.S.C.A.§§ 1253(a)(5),
1272(b). But see note 25 supra.
29. The land use planning provisions of Section 522 of the SMCRA were roundly criti-
cized by industry representatives at the committee hearings on the bill. One spokesman
called them a "backdoor approach to the establishment of [state] land use programs." See
1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 1031, 1139-40. Observations such as these overstate
the result since the designation provisions in the Act are perforce germane only to those lands
where surface coal mining is potentially feasible-a small percentage of land even in the most
heavily impacted states. See SMCRA § 522(a), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
30. SMCRA § 522(a)(4), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(4) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
No. 2]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
ability of land for surface coal mining . . . shall be integrated as
closely as possible with present and future land use planning and
regulation processes at the Federal, State and local levels." 3'
This last provision is subject to a variety of interpretations. A
crucial question concerns its intended scope. Since the applicability
of the section is limited to "determinations of the unsuitability of
land for surface coal mining," it is uncertain whether the drafters
intended that this provision include determinations that land is
suitable for surface coal mining (as when a petition to designate
land as unsuitable is denied) as well as determinations that land is
unsuitable for such mining. A strict reading of the statutory lan-
guage would seem to favor the narrower interpretation. Such a read-
ing, however, makes little practical sense. Indeed, it is where lands
are found to be suitable for surface coal mining that the most serious
land use conflicts will arise. The opening of lands to surface coal
mining is more difficult to mesh with land use planning than is a
restriction on surface coal mining methods. Moreover, since the
provision seeks to insure coordination with other land use determi-
nations, Congress most likely intended the broader interpretation of
the provision to govern.
A second question prompted by this provision is whether it was
intended to require substantive as well as procedural integration of
unsuitability determinations. The pertinent language reads:
"determinations . . . shall be integrated . . . with . . . land use
planning and regulation processes." If "planning" is construed as an
adjective modifying "processes," then the requirement would seem
to be merely procedural. But if "planning" is construed as a noun
then the provision implicates substantive as well as procedural inte-
gration. Further complexity exists in the requirement that designa-
tion determinations rather than designation processes be integrated
with land use planning and regulation processes. Integration of a
determination with a plan or process requires a substantive exami-
nation of the merits of the issue presented. If the drafters had in-
tended to require merely procedural integration they should have
required integration of determination processes with planning and
regulation processes. Thus, the only satisfactory resolution of this
problem appears to be to treat the provision as requiring substantive
and procedural integration.
A further question of interpretation is presented by the provi-
sion which requires that designation determinations be integrated
"as closely as possible" with land use planning and regulation pro-
31. Id. § 522(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(5).
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cesses at the state, federal, and local level. The phrase "as closely
as possible" suggests an inflexible standard; 32 but another provision
in the same section of the Act seems to give the regulatory authority
discretion to refuse to designate lands unsuitable for surface coal
mining even where such a determination is incompatible with local
or state land use plans.3 3 If a designation determination must be
integrated "as closely as possible" with applicable land use plan-
ning for the area, then a designation determination could rarely be
made that was incompatible with such planning. Thus, the discre-
tion of the regulatory authority would appear to be severely under-
mined if not altogether destroyed.
If designation determinations must be substantively integrated
with federal, state, and local land use plans, the impacts may be
profound. Consider, for example, the impact of agency designation
of certain federal lands as unsuitable for surface coal mininj3 on a
state regulatory authority's decision regarding adjacent non-federal
lands. The SMCRA arguably imposes an affirmative obligation on
the state regulatory authority to insure that their decision respects
a federal designation, even to the extent that it forces an undesired
decision. An illustration will perhaps better, demonstrate the poten-
tial dilemma.
Suppose tract X, federal land, lies directly west of tract Y, non-
federal land. Both X and Y contain known strippable coal reserves.
The federal land management agency determines that surface coal
mining on tract X would result in significant damage to important
aesthetic values and on this basis designates it as unsuitable for
surface coal mining. May a state regulatory authority permit sur-
face coal mining on tract Y even where it would adversely affect the
federal designation of tract X?31 Arguably the state cannot, since
the state's decision is not substantively integrated with the federal
designation.
2. The Petitioning Process-"Any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected" has the right to petition the
32. In Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act the phrase "to the fullest
extent possible" is used to describe the duty of federal agencies. In discussing the meaning
of this phrase, which seems analogous to the phrase "as closely as possible," Judge Wright
stated: "[flit sets a high standard for agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced
by the reviewing courts. . . . Thus the Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible." Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (1971).
33. SMCRA § 522(a)(4)(A), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Nov. 1977). See text
accompanying note 58 infra.
34. See note 28 supra.
35. A similar conflict might be expected to arise between two state regulatory authori-
ties along state borders.
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regulatory authority to have lands other than federal lands' 7 desig-
nated as unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining.
Likewise, persons may petition to have such designations termi-
nated.' The petitioner must submit evidence to support his claim
and other persons, whether legally interested or not, may submit
additional evidence either supporting or opposing the petition.
Within ten months from filing and proper notice, a public hearing
must be held at or near the area proposed for designation. A written
decision on the petition supported with reasons must be issued
within sixty days from the date of the hearing and furnished to all
parties to the hearing2
3. Surface Coal Mining Impact Statements-Before designat-
ing any land as unsuitable for surface coal mining the regulatory
authority must prepare a detailed statement that addresses: "(i) the
potential coal resources of the area, (ii) the demand for coal re-
sources, and (iii) the impact of such designation on the environ-
ment, the economy, and the supply of coal.4" Considering past expe-
rience with the environmental impact statements required by Sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 19691'
(NEPA) and the immense amount of litigation that provision has
36. The petitioning process described here should not be confused with that which was
proposed for national forest lands. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra. There petitions
went directly to the Interior and Agriculture Departments; here the petitions go to the regula-
tory authority.
37. SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977). Though the SMCRA
would not seem to include federal lands among those which are subject to petitioning, the
Secretary of Interior might promulgate regulations to allow such designations. See the discus-
sion on federal lands at text accompanying note 65 infra.
38. The standing granted by this provision is not as broad as that in the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), which allows any citizen to bring an action, but it is essentially the
same as the provision found in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(Supp. V 1975). This latter provision has been characterized as a legislative enactment of the
standing test put forth in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700-01 nn.47-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Sierra Club, the
Court followed the two part test which it had announced in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). This approach requires the party alleging
standing to show an "injury in fact" and to show injury to an interest "arguably within the
zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statute. Sierra Club refined this test by
recognizing esthetic and environmental injuries, even where the injury was incurred by a large
number of persons, so long as the persons claiming standing could show a personal injury.
Thus, petitioners under the designation provisions of the SMCRA need only allege some
personal impairment of their recreational or environmental interests to have standing to bring
the petition. Once a valid petition is filed, however, any person whether "interested" or not
may intervene in the proceeding. SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C.A.§ 1272(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
See also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
39. A hearing need not be held if all petitioners so stipulate. SMCRA § 522(c), 30
U.S.C.A. § 1272(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
40. Id. § 522(d), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(d).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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spawned 2 over the adequacy of these costly and often volumninous
studies, the regulatory authority is likely to look upon this require-
ment with some trepidation.43 Moreover, the NEPA statement must
only address environmental impacts while the SMCRA statement
requires the consideration of economic and coal related issues as
well. Still, the impact statement requirement can, if carefully con-
trolled, be a useful tool for the decision maker.
Aside from the mechanical problems the impact statement re-
quirement will engender, the SMCRA presently mandates the prep-
aration of these statements in one situation where they are wholly
superflous; that is, where designation is mandatory because the
reclamation of land is not feasible. In such cases, an impact state-
ment would serve no useful purpose and could possibly undermine
the mandatory nature of the provision. If studies conducted solely
to determine the reclamation potential of the land reveal that the
reclamation is infeasible then no more studies should be made.
Requiring the regulatory authority to prepare a statement that also
addresses economic and coal related impacts is not merely wasteful
of taxpayer's money; it raises the specter of extraneous factors
weighing heavily in a decision that should only take into account
reclamation potential.
B. Mandatory Designations
The designation of lands as unsuitable for surface coal mining
is mandatory only where reclamation in accordance with the provi-
sions of the SMCRA is not economically and technologically feasi-
ble.44 Because the SMCRA standards for reclaiming surface coal
mined lands are vastly different depending on the kind of land
involved, the definitions section of the Act does not define the term
"reclamation."4" It is, however, essential that the regulatory author-
ity in charge of administering the designation provisions have a
thorough understanding of what the Act requires for reclamation on
any given site.
42. See cases noted at 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (1976) (notes 251-81).
43. One industry representative criticized this provision on the ground that it would
allow "irresponsible gadflies to tie up thousands of acres of land" by arbitrarily initiating
proceedings under section 522. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 170 (statement
of Steven L. Friedman, Counsel, Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association). This criticism does
not seem justified, however, since all petitions must contain "allegations of facts with sup-
porting evidence which would tend to establish the allegations." SMCRA § 522(c), 30
U.S.C.A. § 1272(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
44. SMCRA § 522(a)(2), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(2) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
45. The reclamation standards established by the SMCRA are, for the most part, set
out at section 515, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265.
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The reclamation standards set by the SMCRA fall into two
basic categories: (1) land restoration; and (2) restoration of hydrol-
ogical integrity. The former involves: (a) returning impacted land
to a condition capable of supporting its uses prior to mining or to
"higher and better" uses that are reasonably likely;" (b) backfilling,
compacting, grading, and in most cases, restoring the approximate
original contour47 of the land; and (c) replacing topsoils and other
soil layers sufficient to ensure the successful reintroduction of native
plant and animal species. Restoration of hydrological integrity in-
volves: (a) protecting natural watercourses from erosion and acid
mine drainage;" (b) restoring aquifers and other underground water
systems; and (c) cleaning out and removing settling ponds or silta-
tion structures built to treat mine water.49
A substantial part of the burden of insuring that the designa-
tion of lands not meeting these standards falls on the general public.
The language of the Act suggests that lands subject to administra-
tive designation may only be designated by petition. 0 The proper
role of the regulatory authority throughout the petitioning process,
however, may not have been adequately considered by the drafters
of the statute. Certainly the regulatory authority acts as a judge, but
may it also act as an advocate? The law states that any person may
46. SMCRA § 515(b)(2), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(2) (Supp. Nov. 1977). The reference to
higher and better uses is somewhat troublesome considering the variety of interpretations
that might be accorded the phrase. A few state courts have concluded that this phrase was
meant to refer to higher and better financial uses. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n of Trumbill, 156 Conn. 99, 239 A.2d 528 (1968); South Side Elevated R. R.
v. Frieberg, 221 Ill. 508, 77 N.E. 920 (1906). These cases, however, arose in significantly
different contexts. Thus, if the mining site could be returned to a condition capable of
supporting a power plant and there was a reasonable likelihood of a power plant being built
on the site, reclamation could be deemed in compliance with the Act. However, given that
tle section of the law under which this phrase appears is entitled, "Environmental Protection
Performance Standards," a reasoned argument could be made that the provision was meant
to refer to higher and better environmental uses. Any other reading would substantially
undercut the strict reclamation standards required by the Act.
47. SMCRA § 701(2), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(2) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
48. Acid mine drainage, a common phenomena in mining, is caused by the exposure of
mine waste, such as pyrite, to surface, ground, or rain water with which it reacts to form
sulphuric acid. The acid mixes with the water and thus makes its way into rivers, streams
and lakes where it kills fish and causes other damage.
49. See generally GRIM & HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SURFACE MINING OF COAL
(Environmental Protection Technology Series, EPA-670/2-74-093, 1974); NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES ENGINEERING STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE POTENTIAL FOR REHABILITATING LANDS
SURFACE MINED FOR COAL IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES, REHABILITATION OF WESTERN COAL
LANDS (a Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974).
50. The Act seems to limit the regulatory authority's designation powers to actions on
petitions since the pertinent sections for designating lands begin with the words, "Upon
petition pursuant to subsection (c) of this section." SMCRA § 522(a)(2), (3), 30 U.S.C.A. §
1272 (a)(2), (3) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
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file a petition or intervene in a proceeding. The SMCRA defines
"person" as "any individual, partnership, association, society, joint
stock company, firm, company, corporation or other business organ-
ization." ' Was this language intended to exclude the regulatory
authority? From a practical point of view, the question deserves a
negative response, for it is the regulatory authority, more than any
other individual or group, that possesses the interdisciplinary exper-
tise'" and has the resources to accumulate the necessary evidence
upon which to make an informed determination. Moreover, the cost
of culling needed evidence is most rationally borne by the regulatory
authority since all studies concerning the reclamation capacity of
lands will be valuable to the regulatory authority in future situa-
tions regardless of the outcome of the petition. Aside from these
observations, it might be argued that the Act implicitly imposes on
the regulatory authority an affirmative obligation to make indepen-
dent determinations as to the unsuitability of land for surface coal
mining.53 Thus, allowing the regulatory authority to petition will
help the regulatory authority meet this obligation. This interpreta-
tion also obviates the apparent conflict with the definition of "per-
son" noted above.
Given resource limitations and sound management policies, it
would be impractical for the regulatory authority to become actively
involved in every designation petition filed. It is therefore suggested
that the following procedures be implemented:54
(1) Insure the right of any person, including the regulatory
authority, to instigate the petition process."
(2) Once a petition is filed, the regulatory authority should
notify the petitioner and other interested parties of the location of
known evidence that might have an impact on the designation of the
subject site.
(3) Place the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
51. Id. § 701(20), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(20).
52. The regulatory authority seemingly is required to possess interdisciplinary expertise.
Id. §§ 503(a)(3), 522(a)(4)(B), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1253(a)(3), 1272(a)(4)(B).
53. The Act requires each state "to establish a planning process enabling objective
decisions. . . as to which, if any, land areas of a State are unsuitable for all or certain types
of surface coal mining operations." Id. § 522(a)(1), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(1). See also id.
§ 503(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(5). This suggests an affirmative obligation on the state to
make independent decisions concerning the availability of lands for surface coal mining.
54. Such procedures might be incorporated into each state and federal program under
the authority of Sections 503(a)(5) and 522(a) of the SMCRA, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1253(a)(5),
1272(a) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
55. If the regulatory authority is ultimately allowed to participate in the petitioning
process the regulations ought to require that its investigative functions be kept wholly sepa-
rate from its hearings functions.
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on the petitioner. 6 Once the burden has been met, permit the regu-
latory authority to produce additional evidence prior to the hearing
where, in its discretion, such evidence is necessary to make an in-
formed decision, and where the regulatory authority determines
that the petitioner does not have adequate expertise or resources to
prove its claims.
(4) If, after the required hearing, there still exists a reasonable
doubt as to the reclamation potential of the subject lands, require
a comprehensive reclamation study oni the site.1
7
C. Discretionary Designations
The petitioning process may be used to designate lands as un-
suitable for reasons other than the infeasibility of reclamation. A
designation under these other categories, however, is discretionary.
The SMCRA provides:
Lands may be designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining if such
operations will:
(A) be incompatible with existing State or local land use
plans or programs; or
(B) affect fragile or historic lands in which -such opera-
tions could result in significant damage to important historic,
cultural, scientific and esthetic values and natural systems; or
(C) affect renewable resource lands in which such opera-
tions could result in a substantial loss or reduction of long range
productivity of water supply or of food or fiber products, and
such lands to include aquifers and aquifer recharge areas; or
(D) affect natural hazard lands in which such operations
could substnatially endanger life and property, such lands to
include areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of unstable
geology. 8
The SMCRA offers no guidance as to how the regulatory authority
should exercise its discretion. The Secretary of Interior should,
therefore, promulgate regulations to curb arbitrary decisions. These
regulations should focus on appropriate methods for establishing an
objective decision making apparatus capable of handling the kinds
of planning decisions envisioned in the discretionary designation
section of the SMCRA, and should make the establishment of such
56. The SMCRA requires that the petitioner have the initial burden of proof. See
SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(c) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
57. The type of study envisioned by Section 522(d) of the SMCRA is necessaryhere.
As was discussed in text accompanying notes 40-43 supra, such a study may be unduly broad
for its suggested purpose.
58. SMCRA § 522(a)(3), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(3) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
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an apparatus a condition precedent to approval of any state or fed-
eral program. 9
While it is tempting to suggest that regulations should provide
definitions for such phrases as "significant damage," "important
historic, cultural, scientific and esthetic values," and "substantial
losses of long range productivity," values such as these defy accur-
ate definition.'" Each case must be considered on its own merits.
Regulations might give some direction, however, by providing spe-
cific examples. For instance, the regulations might posit that sur-
face mining operations which impair the water quality in a wat-
ershed and thereby threaten the use of lower lands for agriculture
and livestock for a period of twenty years from the inception of
mining operations cause "a substantial loss. . . of long range prod-
uctivity."
Of even greater import, perhaps, is the need for regulations that
offer guidance as to the procedures that the regulatory authority
ought to utilize in the designation process. Because the administra-
tor's discretion is expressly preserved by the statute, the regulations
should not impose on a state a scheme which dictates when its
authority should be exercised. But the regulations should insist that
each state program contain a fair and rational process for making
discretionary designations. Further, the regulations ought to set out
an exemplary scheme which would be used on all federal lands and
which any state could opt to use on its own lands.
The following procedures are proposed for use by the regulatory
authority whenever a petition is filed to have lands designated
under the discretionary provisions of the SMCRA.
(1) To the extent practical, utilize the same basic procedures
for discretionary designations as are established for mandatory des-
ignations.
(2) Make a preliminary determination as to whether any of
the lands addressed in the petition fall within any of the four discre-
tionary categories as defined by the Act and the applicable regula-
tions.
(3) If the lands are found not to meet any of the four catego-
ries, issue a decision tentatively denying the petition on this basis,
59. The SMCRA requires the establishment bf "a planning process enabling objective
decisions based upon competently and scientifically sound data and information as to which,
if any, land areas of a state are unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining." Id.
§ 522(a)(1), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(1).
60. During the hearings several persons testified as to the ambiguity of these provisions
but they were left unchanged in the final bill. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
753, 762, 815, 830.
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and then hold a hearing as required by the SMCRA solely on this
issue. After the hearing, render a final decision on whether the lands
described in the petition fall within the delineated categories. Affir-
mation of the preliminary decision constitutes a final agency action
and further review must be sought through the courts.
(4) If the lands are found to meet any of the discretionary
categories, prepare a surface coal mining impact statement"' as au-
thorized by Section 522(d) of the Act, placing particular emphasis
on the characterization(s) in the petition which allegedly makes the
land unsuitable for surface coal mining.
(5) Hold a hearing on the merits of designating the subject
lands, allowing at least 30 days for review of the completed surface
coal mining impact statement prior to the hearing.2 Use this state-
ment together with the petitions of all parties as the basis for the
hearing and the record. This hearing should be held on the record
and thus subject to the procedural safeguards of Section 5 of the
Administrative Procedures Act.63
(6) Render a written decision with reasons on the merits of the
whole record.
The process suggested here would help ensure the accountability for
discretionary decisions and would permit courts a more solid frame-
work for review.
Two points in the proposed process appear particularly vulner-
able to litigation. These are the initial characterization of lands as
within or without the delineated categories and the substantive
soundness of the final agency decision. Problems in thess areas can
be limited and hopefully avoided by a detailed explanation of the
reasons the lands were determined not to fall within the categories
alleged in the petition using the express language of the statute and
examples provided in the proposed regulations, by ensuring the
collection and competent analysis of all pertinent information,64 and
by insisting that all proceedings be open to the public. Although an
orderly and open process will not always prevent the filing of law-
suits, it should help provide reasoned decisions.
D. Federal Lands
The designation provisions of the SMCRA place federal lands
61. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
62. The SMCRA sets a ten month deadline for hearings from the date of petition and
since the preparation of an impact statement may take a considerable amount of time it may
be difficult to provide interested parties with sufficient time to review the statement prior to
the hearing.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
64. As with mandatory designations, the regulatory authority ought to be assured the
opportunity to participate in the filing of petitions and the collection of this data.
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in a category all their own. 5 The Secretary of Interior is given the
exclusive authority to make designation determinations for federal
lands, after consulting with the affected state." The Act affirma-
tively commits the Secretary to review all federal lands to ascertain
whether any areas fall within the mandatory or discretionary cate-
gories that apply to non-federal lands. If any federal lands fall
within those categories the Secretary must withdraw such area or
condition any mineral leasing or mineral entries in a manner so as
to limit surface coal mining operations on such area.""7 The Secre-
tary may permit surface coal mining prior to completing the review
of all federal lands. Although the Act itself is unclear, it would seem
reasonable to interpret this provision- to mean that the review of
lands where advance permission is granted must already have been
accomplished. In any event, since the Secretary has discretion in
this matter, a regulation should be promulgated to clearly reflect
the suggested meaning.
The review provisions for federal lands seem clear, but, to the
extent that they are incongruous with the approach established for
non-federal lands, they are likely to generate problems. Most ob-
vious perhaps, is the fact that the petitioning process ostensibly
applies only to nonfederal lands, yet areas that persons will want to
have designated are not likely to respect federal, non-federal bound-
aries. 8 No logical reason exists for restricting petitions to non-
federal lands. The Secretary of Interior might easily resolve this,
dilemma by promulgating regulations which extend petitioning
rights to federal lands. Although apparently not required by the Act,
the implementation of such a procedure would complement the Sec-
retary's review mandate and seems consistent with the intent of the
Act.69
The most troublesome feature of the provisions for designating
federal lands is that they fail to address designations of lands sub-
ject to existing federal coal leases where surface mining operations
had not commenced prior to the passage of the Act. The SMCRA
seems to confine the Secretary's authority to prospective federal
65. SMCRA § 522(b), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(b) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
66. Id. § 503(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(5).
67. Id. § 522(b), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(b).
68. The requirement that designation determinations be integrated with state and local
land use plans might alleviate this problem to some extent. See id. § 522(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1272(a)(5); text accompanying note 31 supra.
69. See Id. § 201(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1211(c)(2) which requires the Secretary to "publish
and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and
provisions of this Act."
70. Surface mining operations begun prior to the passage of the SMCRA are exempt
from the designation provisions. See id. § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(6).
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leases since the Act allows him only to withdraw land7' and condi-
tion mineral leases-not to withdraw present leases. Why the Act
requires a review of all federal lands is therefore not clear. Further-
more, persons with federal leases seem to enjoy greater protection
than owners of private mineral estates whose lands are plainly sub-
ject to designation. 72 Conceivably, these questions could be an-
swered by a finding that the Secretary of Interior does, in fact, have
the authority to designate lands over existing coal leases as unsuita-
ble for surface coal mining. Even if the Secretary's authority in this
matter is upheld, however, two significant roadblocks to designating
leased lands will remain. The first is the claim of the lessee that his
lease granted him a right to extract coal subject only to the terms
and conditions of the lease and the applicable regulations in effect
when the lease was issued, and that the federal government is es-
topped from imposing any conditions on the lease that would effec-
tively preclude its development. 7
3
Traditionally it was thought that the government could not be
estopped, the theory being that "the King could do no wrong. '74
Gradually, however, that anachronistic view has worn away, and
the modern trend has moved toward allowing the government to be
estopped, particularly in those instances where it is exercising a
proprietary function. 75 The question likely to arise in the present
situation concerns representations made by the federal government
in its leases76 and the extent to which these were relied upon by the
lessees. The lessee, will try to show that his lease is proprietary in
71. Withdrawals of federal land are made pursuant to Section 204 of the Federal Land
Policy and Managment Act of 1976, which defines a withdrawal as "withholding an area of
Federal land from settlement, sale, location, or entry under some or all of the general land
laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under those laws in order to maintain other public
values in the areas." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (1976).
72. The push to designate federal lands presently under lease will likely receive its
greatest support from the environmental community, but, in one sense at least, it is worthy
of the support of the coal industry as well. The coal companies know that under the SMCRA
they will have to meet stringent environmental standards, see SMCRA § 515, 30 U.S.C. §
1265 (Supp. Nov. 1977), including a showing that the land can be reclaimed in accordance
with the requirements of the Act. See id. § 508, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1258. If a determination is
ultimately made that the land cannot be reclaimed, the coal company is far better off know-
ing this prior to the time it has expended considerable sums of money developing a mining
plan that would, in the end, have to be rejected by the regulatory authority.
73. While all federal coal leases provide for readjustment of their terms every twenty
years, the lessee will claim that the government cannot impose such new conditions as would
make the mining of the coal physically or economically impossible. See 30 U.S.C. § 207
(1976).
74. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.01 (1958).
75. Id. § 17.09.
76. See United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Form 3130-1 (October, 1967), which is the standard form coal lease used by the BLM.
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nature, that the lease gave him a right to surface mine for coal, and
that prior to the passage of the SMCRA he had expended a consider-
able sum of money in reliance on this right. By contrast, the govern-
ment will contend that the lease conferred no abolute right to sur-
face mine for coal and that the lease was conditioned upon the right
of the Secretary, acting in the public interest, to impose reasonable
changes in its terms,7 7 including the designation of at least a portion
of the lands under lease as unsuitable for surface coal mining.
Once over the estoppel hurdle there still remains the question
of whether or not designating leased lands constitutes an unlawful
taking. That question will now be addressed in the broader context
of the entire designation section.
III. THE TAKINGS PROBLEM
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, forbids
the taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion .7 Though a strict reading of the amendment suggests that it
applies only where there has been a physical invastion of property,
the courts have long recognized that government regulations which
cause substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of one's
property may, in some instances, constitute a "taking." It is in this
sense that the designation provisions of the SMCRA are likely to be
challenged.
Suppose, for example, that prior to the enactment of the
SMCRA X Company purchased a fee simple estate, a mineral es-
tate, or a coal lease on land known to be valuable for strippable coal.
Subsequently, the land was designated as unsuitable for all forms
of surface coal mining, thus drastically reducing its value. Was the
designation an unconstitutional taking of private property for a
public use without just compensation?
The history of the fifth amendment suggests that actions taken
by a state aimed at protecting the public health, safety and welfare,
commonly referred to as an exercise of state police powers, do not
fall within the ambit of the fifth amendment takings clause.79 Since
77. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 757 (Ct. Cl.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951) ("In general, an officer authorized to make a contract
for the United States has the implied authority thereafter to modify its terms particularly
where it is clearly in the interest of the public to do so").
78. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
79. See Stever, Land Use Controls, Takings and the Police Power-A Discussion of the
Myth, 15 N.H.B.J. 149, 153 (1974). In discussing the history of the takings clause, Stever
notes: "The pattern of English regulatory law demonstrates quite convincingly that the
[takings] clause was not intended to be a limit on the police power." See also Mugler v.
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the designation provisions are easily defended as police power-type
provisions, "' the historical perspective on the fifth amendment sug-
gests that designations made pursuant to the SMCRA do not impli-
cate any compensation requirement. Many courts, however, have
ignored this historical evidence and have relied on other factors,
most notably, the amount of diminution in property value resulting
from the regulation,8 ' in deciding whether or not a taking has oc-
curred. Thus, what once may have been a rather straight forward
legal problem has evolved into a complex and confusing controversy
over which much scholarly debate has ensued.
2
Fortunately, several important developments in takings law,
which are particularly relevant to the designation provisions in the
SMCRA, can be gleaned from the case law without becoming totally
immersed in this polemical. Central to the discussion is the fact that
where there is a near total diminution in the value of private prop-
erty as a result of a government regulation, the courts are strongly
inclined to find that a taking in violation of the fifth amendment
has occurred. The classic articulation of the diminution in value
theory appeared in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.83 That case
concerned a law passed by the State of Pennsylvania which forbade
(except in certain situations irrelevant to the case) the mining of
coal which caused the subsidence of any human dwellings. The
surface owner brought an action under this law to enjoin the owner
of the mineral estate, Pennsylvania Coal Co., from mining the coal
under the surface owner's home. Writing for a a majority of the
Court, Justice Holmes held that the Pennsylvania law went "too
far" in the regulation of private property since it caused the value
of the property to be substantially diminished: "When [the diminu-
tion of value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), where the Court stated: "A prohibition simply upon the use of
property for purposes that are declared by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit." Id. at 668-69.
80. The constitutional basis for the SMCRA was the commerce power. But where, as
in this case, the commerce power is used to promote the public welfare, see SMCRA § § 101(c),
102(h), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(c), 1202(h) (Supp. Nov. 1977), it is commonly referred to as the
"national police power." See, e.g., LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 254 (4th ed. 1975); Cashmen, The National Police Power
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381 (1919); Fuller, Is
There a Federal Police Power?, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1904).
81. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50-60 (1965).
82. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1198 (1967); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, supra note 81; Stever, supra
note 79.
83. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensa-
tion to sustain the act."84
A strict application of the diminution in value theory could
profoundly undermine the efficacy of the designation provisions in
the SMCRA, for certainly most designations will substantially dim-
inish the value of the land involved. The theory appears to have
undergone several refinements, however, which should tend to
lessen its significance and which may ultimately provide an ade-
quate framework for defending most designations made under the
SMCRA For example, if a designation and consequent diminution
in value can be shown to impact only a portion of an aggrieved
party's land, then the prevailing view seems to be that no taking has
occurred. Typical of this view are the wetlands cases where a finding
that the owner has the right to fill only a portion of his land has been
generally sufficient to sustain a regulation prohibiting the filling of
wetlands."
Another important development appeared in Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead."6 In this case, the enactment of an ordinance
prohibiting excavations below the water table effectively closed the
defendant's sand and gravel mining operation. The Supreme Court
held that the fact that the property was deprived of its most benefi-
cial use did not render the ordinance unconstitutional, since the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the town's police powers. 7 The
import of Goldblatt lies in its inference that property subject to
government regulation which retains some benefical use cannot be
considered to have been unconstitutionally taken. Seen in this light,
the Goldblatt decision might dispose of several situations under
which SMCRA designations could be challenged. For example, if a
person owned both the surface and mineral estate of land, a designa-
tion of unsuitability for surface coal mining would not be considered
a taking if the surface was valuable for other purposes. Similarly, if
the coal could be extracted by other, albeit more expensive meth-
ods, such as underground or in situ methods, then a designation that
84. Id. at 413.
85. This view seems to have prevailed despite its ostensible inconsistency with the
holding in Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental
Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 137, 336 A.2d 239
(1975); Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (1975). In
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), however, the. Maine Wetlands Act was held
unconstitutional where it was found that certain land had no value absent the right to fill it.
86. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
87. Id. at 592, 596. The Court declined to decide whether a deprivation of all beneficial
use of the land would render the regulation unconstitutional, since that issue was not before
it. Id. at 594.
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the land was unsuitable for surface coal mining would likely not be
deemed a taking.
A final important development in takings law strikes at the
heart of the diminution in value theory and may in fact signal its
eventual demise. In Consolidated Rock Products v. City of Los
Angeles, 11 the California Supreme Court held that even where there
is a total diminution in property value as a result of a government
regulation, if that regulation is reasonably necessary to prevent in-
jury to others then no compensation is required. In that case, a
zoning ordinance restricted plaintiff's property to agricultural or
residential use. The trial court found that the property was of great
value for rock, sand, and gravel extraction yet worthless for other
purposes. It further found that the excavation and production oper-
ations proposed by the plaintiff were probably compatible with ad-
jacent land uses, although it acknowledged that "reasonable minds
might differ" on that conclusion. Nonetheless, the California Su-
preme Court upheld the ordinance. Quoting in part from a prior
California decision, 9 the court stated:
The primary purpose of comprehensive zoning is to protect oth-
ers, and the general public from uses of property which will, if permit-
ted, prove injurious to them. . . . "So far as such use of one's prop-
erty may be had without injury to others, it is a lawful use which
cannot be absolutely prohibited". . . . [T]he legislative body in our
case has determined that the prohibited use cannot be had without
injury to others."
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of this case which
technically is a decision on the merits; but, since the holding in this
case severely undercuts the Pennsylvania Coal decision it must be
viewed with some circumspection. Still, it is in line with some older
Supreme Court opinions9" and thus offers an attractive argument for
the courts and prospective litigants.9 2 Should the Consolidated
Rocks decision prevail, it will provide an ideal defense to SMCRA
designations, since surface coal mining operations will invariably
have extraterritorial impacts causing some injury to others.
88. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
36 (1962).
89. In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905).
90. 370 P.2d at 348 (emphasis in original)
91. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See note 79 supra.
92. The approach taken by the California Court in Consolidated Rocks is essentially
the same as that advocated by Professor Sax. See Sax, supra note 82, at 163. Sax argues that
restrictions on uses of land should not be deemed compensable takings if such uses cause what
he calls "spillover effects." Interestingly, Sax uses surface mining on a steep slope as the
paradigm of a spillover type use.
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Despite the erosion which the diminution in value theory has
experienced, it is certainly not dead,13 and the careful litigant would
be well-advised to avoid attacking the theory directly if at all possi-
ble. A much safer approach would be to show how the designation
fits within one or more of the cases described above. Indeed, the one
case which has recently considered the takings problem in conjunc-
tion with designation provisions similar to those in the SMCRA94
suggests that diminution in value principles may yet be controlling.
Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. Georges Creek Coal and Land
Co.95 involved the validity of a Maryland statute which prohibited
surface coal mining on all state owned land. The plaintiffs who
owned the mineral estate in such land brought an action against the
state of Maryland, the surface owner, alleging that the statute ef-
fected an unconstitutional taking of their property without just
compensation. After an extensive analysis of the law of takings, the
court remanded the case for a finding as to the magnitude of the loss
suffered by the plaintiffs, thus evincing the Maryland court's con-
tinued recognition of diminution in value principles. 8 Curiously, the
Maryland court did not even mention the Consolidated Rocks deci-
sion and failed to consider whether the mining would cause "injury
to others." Though its continued reliance on diminution in value is
not atypical, the case does suggest the need for additional guidance
from the Supreme Court.
93. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) where the Court stated:
"The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute com-
pensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and is not a
mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory measure." Id. at 48. Indeed, diminution
in value principles appear to have retained some measure of popularity among state courts.
See, e.g., Eldridge v. Palo Alto, 57 Cal.App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976); Bureau of
Mines v. Georges Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974); Czech v. Blaine,
253 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1977).
94. Several state courts have addressed the very question of the validity of prohibiting
surface coal mining on private lands. Most, however, have been in the context of local zoning
ordinances, and the disposition of the constitutional problem has been cursory at best. See,
e.g., Madis v. Higginson, 164 Colo. 320, 434 P.2d 705 (1967); Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt,
21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582 (1961); Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 1 Ill. 2d
200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953); East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 166 Ohio St. 379, 143 N.E.2d
309 (1957); Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954).
95. 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974).
96. The Maryland statute might be distinguished from the SMCRA since it imposed a
blanket prohibition on surface coal mining on state land whereas the federal law is limited
to specific categories of land where surface coal mining is deemed particularly destructive or
incompatible with the use of other lands. This distinction, however, goes to the scope of the
exercise of the power and not to the question of whether the regulation should be considered
a taking. See Bosselman, The Control of Surface Mining: An Exercise in Creative Federalism,
9 NAT. REs. J. 137, 155 (1969).
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IV. THE GRANDFATHER CLAUSE
Section 522(a)(6) of the SMCRA exempts from the designation
provisions all surface coal mining operations in existence as of Au-
gust 3, 1977, or where a permit has been issued pursuant to the Act,
or where "substantial legal and financial commitments" in such
operations were in existence prior to January 4, 1977. The purpose
of this clause was to minimize the economic impacts that the desig-
nation provisions would have if applied retroactively.
The first two exceptions seem reasonable. Given the substantial
capital expenditures involved in a surface coal mining operation, it
would seem unjust to require an existing operator to shut down.
Morever, since the lead time for such an operation is substantial,
the operator could not fairly be accused of rushing in bad faith to
commence operations prior to the passage of the law. Allowing sur-
face coal mining to proceed where a valid SMCRA permit has been
issued is similarly reasonable. The procedures involved in obtaining
a permit are extensive and thus interested parties should have
ample time before a decision is made to submit a designation peti-
tion which would halt issuance of the permit.97
The final exception, however, is, on its face at least, a bit more
troublesome. The meaning of the phrase "substantial legal and fin-
ancial commitments" lacks certainty. The House Report on the
proposed bill explains the phrase as follows:
The phrase 'substantial legal and financial commitments' .
is intended to apply to situations where, on the basis of a long-term
coal contract, investments have been made in powerplants, railroads,
coal handling and storage facilities and other capital-intensive activi-
ties. The committee does not intend that mere ownership or acquisi-
tion costs of the coal itself or the right to mine it should constitute
'substantial legal and financial commitments.'98
Thus, the exception may be narrower than the language indicates,
encompassing only those situations where surface coal mining is
necessary to meet contract obligations entered prior to January 4,
1977. Presumably the language covers capital-intensive activities by
both the coal supplier and user. Though not explicit in the report,
it may be inferred that Congress further intended that where a coal
supplier under contract obligation is in a position to procure coal
from a source other than from lands where surface coal mining is
subject to designation, he must, if commercially reasonable, do so.
97. SMCRA § 510(b)(4), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(b)(4) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
98. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1543, 1581.
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It was clearly the intent of Congress in fashioning this clause to
avoid undue hardships on individual buyers and sellers. Thus, if
such hardships can be avoided without surface coal mining, it might
be argued that the exclusion for substantial legal and financial com-
mitments does not apply.
The exception for substantial legal and financial commitments
received substantial attention from both sides in the legislative
hearings. Many environmentalists felt that the provision should
have been deleted entirely from the bill since it sanctions conduct
by parties who, knowing that this loophole might be incorporated
into the law, negotiated contracts for the purpose of circumventing
the law. These concerns would appear to be borne out by the unsuc-
cessful industry lobby to have the date advanced to the date the law
was enacted,99 presumably so that contracts could be negotiated
prior to the President's signature.
V. CONCLUSION
The recognition that certain lands should be fully protected
from surface coal mning is a welcome land use policy development
and in this sense, the provisions in the SMCRA on degignating lands
as unsuitable for such mining are a giant step forward. For the most
part they are comprehensive in scope and substance. Still, some
refinements are needed. Regulations to clarify the ambiguities and
to affirmatively implement the intent of the law must be promul-
gated. Rigorous enforcement by all regulatory personnel is, of
course, essential. But ultimately, the success of the SMCRA desig-
nation provisions will depend on the ability of the interested public
to marshall its forces towards the intelligent and constructive use
of the law.
MARK S. SQUILLACE
99. See generally 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 364, 815, 830, 905. See also
Reclamation Practices and Environmental Problems of Surface Mining: Hearings on H.2
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 168, 176-77 (1977).
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